THE Red Sea 1984

RED Sea – Mines of August – (Operation HARLING (UK), INTENSE LOOK (US) – 1984)

From “Naval Minewarfare: Politics to Practicalities” by Captain Chris O’Flaherty, Royal Navy (The writing of this publication was partially funded by the Guy Hudson Memorial Trust)

Between 9 July and 15 August 1984 seventeen merchant vessels were affected by a series of underwater explosive incidents in the Gulf of Suez and Bab al-Mandeb straits. All occurred in waters between 30m and 75m deep and affected ships between 600 and 77,000 tonnes. With two additional vessels reporting damage exploiting the possible presence of mines in order to obtain insurance payouts (later dismissed due to their damage being from explosions internal to their hulls), there was more than sufficient evidence for the Egyptian government to ask for mine-clearance assistance, paralleled by a request by the Saudi authorities for assistance in ensuring the ports of Yanbu and Jiddah were open for the annual Hajj pilgrimage.

The first indication of potential mining occurred on 9 July 1984 when the Soviet-flagged cargo vessel Knud Jespersen reported at 03:15 GMT that an explosion had occurred ‘directly under ship whilst she was transiting south away from the exit of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian authorities investigated, finding only slight damage to the ship. She had been sailing in an area near to which mines had previously been laid during conflicts between Egypt and Israel, but the indications of an explosion under the ship excluded a previously unswept floating mine broken free from a prior conflict, and actuation of an old influence mine was unlikely due to the time lapse since conflict and associated mine battery life. The mystery had begun.

Nothing more of interest occurred until 27 July 1984 when in the Gulf of Suez three vessels in quick succession reported underwater explosions. All received superficial damage, but a live minefield was now suspected. Three more explosions were reported the next day, again in the Gulf of Suez, and one more the following morning. Between 31 July 1984 and 1 August 1984 three explosions damaged another three merchantmen, this time in the Southern Red Sea – a new area of mining. Debilitating damage was by now being caused by the mines, and the international community was becoming mobilised.

The Egyptians now saw the threat from mines as a threat to their income; if ships could not transit safely to the Suez Canal the Egyptians would see their fees from transit charges plummet, denuding them of a major source of foreign currency. Egyptians met with US officials and on 31 July issued a Navigational Warning promulgating the danger. The Egyptians also approached the British for advice, but not at this stage for assistance. The Saudi authorities concurrently began to be concerned due to the 4 September 1984 commencement of the Hajj, which was expected to see tens of thousands of Muslim pilgrims transit the area in ferries as they proceeded towards Jiddah and Yanbu.

The fears of both governments were increased on 2 August 1984 when a further three vessels reported mine explosions in the Bab al-Mandeb strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, with the 16,000-ton Panamanian MV Kriti Coral reporting that the explosion ‘lifted vessel [sic] completely clear of water falling heavily with extreme vibrations. The terrorist group Al Jihad (thought to be a pro-Iranian Shiite group connected to the Palestine Liberation Organisation) issued a claim of responsibility for the mining, stating that 190 mines had been laid in the Gulf of Suez and Southern Red Sea. With two vessels now damaged with such severity that they had to be towed to safety, and a terrorist group claiming to have initiated a mining campaign, formal mine countermeasures was required.

With Egyptian minewarfare forces already committed to keeping the Suez Canal itself open for traffic, and Saudi minesweepers considered by their own government as insufficiently equipped and trained, the main countries from whom effective mine countermeasures assistance could be provided were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and The Netherlands. The Egyptians proposed a coordinating committee to maximise the efficiency of any response, but national interest meant that the French did not want to participate, and the Saudis also wished to keep their distance from Egyptian politics. Following another explosion on 3 August 1984, in which the Chinese containership Tang He was damaged by a mine exploding 80 metres from its hull whilst transiting the Bab al-Mandeb strait, formal requests for assistance were on 5 and 6 August issued from the Egyptians and Saudis to named countries, each on a bi-lateral basis.

An international force was despatched comprising United Kingdom, French, Netherlands and Italian mine countermeasures vessels, plus the US Navy’s HM-12 and HM-14 airborne MCM squadrons embarked in USS La Salle (LPD-3) and USS Shreveport (LPD-12). Each force operated under national command and control, in separate areas agreed between the nations’ navies.

US forces used their helicopter minesweeping and brand new helicopter minehunting capability to declare clear substantial areas of the central Gulf of Suez. In a show of confidence of their efforts, on 19 August 1984 they conducted a helicopter lead-through of the aircraft carrier USS America, who transited the area with two minesweeping helicopters in formation ahead of her to ensure no mines remained.

The Dutch also used aircraft as well as ships. Throughout September 1984 a F27 maritime patrol aircraft investigated floating objects off Jiddah, Yanbu and Gizan, providing substantial reassurance to the Saudis and Muslim Hajj pilgrims. By 17 October 1984 their operations off King Faisal Naval Base at Jiddah were complete, coincidentally timed with the last day of Hajj, and the two surface Dutch minehunters proceeded to the Gulf of Suez for two weeks of operations off Adibiyah naval base near Suez.

The three Italian minehunters operated predominantly in the Gulf of Suez, near the immediate exit from the Canal. In a fifty-nine-day mission hampered by high winds and strong currents, of which forty-two days were in the suspected minefields, they searched 124 square miles, found 483 contacts, with 236 of these thoroughly investigated and all eventually classified as ‘non-mine’.

The French operated in two areas. After initial operations off Jiddah and the Gizan anchorages identified no mines, their forces joined together in the southern approaches to the Gulf of Suez (known as ‘Zone 7’) and achieved the most success, finding and clearing ten influence ground mines reported as type KMD2/500. However, when addressing the existential mine threat these did not help as all had an extensive covering of marine growth leading to an assessment that all were left over from the previous Arab–Israel wars.

In her sector, the British minehunter HMS Gavinton was also successful. After finding and destroying an historic ground mine (a German Type-GC from World War II), on 12 September 1984 she discovered a mine-like object in 42 metres of water on the western edge of the southbound traffic separation scheme as it leaves the Suez Canal. Clean and half-buried in mud, her remotely operated vehicle images of the object were inconclusive and it was treated accordingly – with care. As the first of a suspected new mine type it was locally designated the GAV1. A Royal Navy clearance diver rendered it safe on the seabed before it was lifted, towed to the shore and beached, where it was carefully dismantled by Royal Navy Bomb Disposal experts.

The mine’s engraved serial number was noted as being ‘995.12-149-81’. In consequence the designation was changed to mine type ‘995’ matching the first three digits in its serial number, and it was found to be a Soviet-designed multi-influence device containing 720Kg of the explosive RDX-TNT. The digits ‘-81’ at the end of the serial number were concurrently assessed as suggesting a manufacture date of 1981. With this clear physical evidence, the challenge was then to determine who had been responsible for the minelaying.

The only admission of guilt had been from Al Jihad, but assessment of their materiel, motive and opportunity strongly indicated against their actual involvement. With a Soviet-supplied mine being located, investigations also looked at the possibility of Soviet involvement, but the facts that the first ship affected was Soviet registered, damage was subsequently suffered by an East German and then a second Soviet ship, all coupled with strenuous condemnation of the mining by the Soviet authorities, negated this as a realistic possibility. Suspicion also fell on the Iranians, but analysis showed it would not be in their national interest and thus this theory was also dismissed. The primary candidate then became Colonel Qadaffi’s forces from Libya.

It has to be stressed that despite a mine being recovered, no attribution has ever formally been achieved. The circumstantial evidence indicating Libya is, however, strong. In early July the Tripoli-registered ferry Ghat sailed from Libya with, according to Egyptian Intelligence, additional personnel who included Lieutenant Suheir Adham who at that time was head of the Libyan Navy’s minelaying division. Ghat had transited the Suez Canal on 6 July, passing through the southbound traffic separation lane the following day, close to where HMS Gavinton found the sole surviving mine. On 9 July the first explosion occurred under a ship also exiting from the Suez Canal. Ghat proceeded south along the length of the Red Sea to Assab, in Ethiopia. However, she took seven days longer than the usual voyage time before returning to Suez on 21 July for her northbound transit; this additional time was assessed as being sufficient to transit even further south than Assab and through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. After her northbound canal transit she proceeded back to Libya, arriving on 23 July, thereafter resuming her normal trade patterns. The main period of mine explosions commenced on 27 July, which is consistent with the findings of the mine exploitation reported by the British of their recovered mine, which indicated a delayed arming setting of 27 July. The explanation for the first (9 July) mine being that the delayed arming had failed, and the mine had instead armed immediately.

The next key date is 23 August 1984 when it is reported that the French seized the Ghat in the port of Marseilles, albeit in connection with a commercial dispute. Recent damage to her stern ramp indicated that it had been lowered whilst at sea, possibly to allow mines to be laid by rolling them off. This, together with other evidence, was sufficient for the US State Department to publicly state that ‘there is persuasive circumstantial evidence that Libya was involved in mining the entrances to the Red Sea. The question remained: why?

Explanations include mutual hatred by Colonel Qadaffi of President Mubarak, including Qadaffi’s desire to harm Egypt financially, to Libya seeking to operationally test a newly acquired mine stock in an unattributable manner and in an area well away from their own shoreline. The key point is that these are all mere hypothesis and assessments, as despite a mine being recovered, the mining has never been formally attributed to anyone.

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